Banuelos

On April 22, 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States released its judicial opinion of Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi, Attorney General (2025)

Here is a quick break down:

(a) Overview

The Supreme Court addressed the interpretation of the 60-day voluntary departure deadline under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) in immigration law, ruling that when a deadline falls on a weekend or legal holiday, it extends to the next business day. This decision clarifies how deadlines in removal proceedings should be calculated, ensuring consistency with the longstanding regulatory practice in immigration law.

(b) Parties

• Petitioner: Hugo Monsalvo Velázquez (Individual subject to removal from the U.S.)

• Respondent: Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of Florida (representing the federal government)

(c) Procedural Posture

An immigration judge concluded that Hugo Monsalvo Velázquez was removable, however, allowed him a 60-day voluntary departure period. Monsalvo Velázquez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which rejected his appeal, granting an additional 60-day voluntary departure period. Monsalvo Velázquez filed a motion to reopen the case after the 60-day period expired on December 11, 2021 (a Saturday). The BIA rejected the motion, stating “the deadline had passed.” Monsalvo Velázquez appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which upheld the BIA’s decision, agreeing that the “voluntary departure deadline did not extend to the next business day.” The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision, ruling that the voluntary departure deadline should extend to the next business day when it falls on a weekend or holiday.

(d) Facts

Monsalvo Velázquez was placed in removal proceedings, and the immigration judge granted him a 60-day voluntary departure period. After his appeal was denied by the BIA, the Board granted him another 60-day voluntary departure period. The 60th day fell on December 11, 2021, which was a Saturday. Monsalvo filed a motion to reopen the case on Monday, December 13, 2021. However, the BIA rejected the motion, asserting that the voluntary departure period had expired on Saturday. Monsalvo then petitioned for judicial review to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the BIA’s decision.

(e) Question Presented

“When a noncitizen’s voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?” See Question Presented No. 23-929.

(f) Holding

The U.S. Supreme Court held (5-4) that the voluntary departure deadline in 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) extends to the next business day when the 60th day falls on a weekend or legal holiday.

(g) Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction: The Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the petition, as the issue raised was a legal question regarding the interpretation of the statute.
2. Interpretation of “60 Days”: The Court recognized that in legal contexts, “days” is typically understood to exclude weekends and legal holidays. This interpretation aligns with longstanding regulatory practices in immigration law, where deadlines are extended to the next business day if they fall on a weekend or holiday.
3. Regulatory Background: The Court noted that this interpretation was consistent with immigration regulations dating back to the 1950s, which provided that deadlines falling on weekends or holidays should extend to the next business day. This practice has been applied in the context of other immigration deadlines.
4. Congressional Intent: The Court found that when Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, it did so against the backdrop of these longstanding regulatory practices. Thus, the Court presumed Congress intended for this rule to apply to the voluntary departure deadline as well.
5. Government’s Counterarguments: The government argued that voluntary departure deadlines should be treated differently because of the 60-day period chosen by Congress. The Court rejected this argument, noting that nothing in the statutory text or legislative history indicated such an intent.

(h) Editorial Note

Citations:

• Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)
• United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906)
• 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2)
• 8 U.S.C. § 1252

(i) Dissenting Opinions

1. Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Alito, and by Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett in parts): (1)argued that the statutory text clearly refers to calendar days, and courts should not rewrite deadlines based on policy preferences or historical administrative practice; and (2) warned against applying regulatory gloss to clear statutory provisions.
2. Justice Alito (joined by Justice Kavanaugh): (1) emphasized textual fidelity and warned that the Court’s decision risks judicially amending clear statutory language; and (2) expressed concern that the majority’s interpretive approach blurs the distinction between legislative and judicial roles.
3. Justice Barrett (joined by Justice Kavanaugh): (1) Focused on statutory interpretation principles; and (2) Criticized the majority for stretching a rule developed in the regulatory context to govern statutory deadlines without textual support.

(j) Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi clarifies a significant procedural issue in immigration law: when voluntary departure deadlines fall on a weekend or legal holiday, noncitizens may rely on the next business day to take action without penalty. This interpretation aligns immigration law with broader legal norms governing deadline calculations across federal practice.

The decision promotes procedural fairness and reflects a pragmatic understanding of how litigants interact with government systems—most of which do not operate on weekends or holidays. By siding with longstanding regulatory practice and rejecting a rigid textual reading of “days” as calendar days, the Court ensures consistency within immigration procedures and prevents unjust procedural defaults caused solely by timing.

• Legal Significance: The Court reinforced the principle that statutory terms, especially those related to deadlines, must be read in light of established administrative and procedural norms unless Congress clearly says otherwise.
• Practical Impact: Noncitizens and their counsel can now be assured that voluntary departure deadlines falling on weekends or holidays will not jeopardize their procedural rights if filings occur on the next business day.
• Institutional Message: The Court’s majority emphasized a harmonized legal system over hyper-literalism, signaling a willingness to interpret statutes in context—especially when agencies have developed longstanding practices.

This ruling also exposes a philosophical divide on the Court about the role of precedent, administrative interpretation, and textualism. While the majority favored a contextual and historical lens, the dissenters advocated strict adherence to the statutory text, warning against judicial overreach.