Tag: United States Supreme Court Law Review

• Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi (2025)

  On April 22, 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States released its judicial opinion of Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi, Attorney General (2025)

  Here is a quick break down:

  (a) Overview

  The Supreme Court addressed the interpretation of the 60-day voluntary departure deadline under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) in immigration law, ruling that when a deadline falls on a weekend or legal holiday, it extends to the next business day. This decision clarifies how deadlines in removal proceedings should be calculated, ensuring consistency with the longstanding regulatory practice in immigration law.

  (b) Parties

  • Petitioner: Hugo Monsalvo Velázquez (Individual subject to removal from the U.S.)

  • Respondent: Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of Florida (representing the federal government)

  (c) Procedural Posture

  An immigration judge concluded that Hugo Monsalvo Velázquez was removable, however, allowed him a 60-day voluntary departure period. Monsalvo Velázquez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which rejected his appeal, granting an additional 60-day voluntary departure period. Monsalvo Velázquez filed a motion to reopen the case after the 60-day period expired on December 11, 2021 (a Saturday). The BIA rejected the motion, stating “the deadline had passed.” Monsalvo Velázquez appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which upheld the BIA’s decision, agreeing that the “voluntary departure deadline did not extend to the next business day.” The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision, ruling that the voluntary departure deadline should extend to the next business day when it falls on a weekend or holiday.

  (d) Facts

  Monsalvo Velázquez was placed in removal proceedings, and the immigration judge granted him a 60-day voluntary departure period. After his appeal was denied by the BIA, the Board granted him another 60-day voluntary departure period. The 60th day fell on December 11, 2021, which was a Saturday. Monsalvo filed a motion to reopen the case on Monday, December 13, 2021. However, the BIA rejected the motion, asserting that the voluntary departure period had expired on Saturday. Monsalvo then petitioned for judicial review to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the BIA’s decision.

  (e) Question Presented

  “When a noncitizen’s voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?” See Question Presented No. 23-929.

  (f) Holding

  The U.S. Supreme Court held (5-4) that the voluntary departure deadline in 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) extends to the next business day when the 60th day falls on a weekend or legal holiday.

  (g) Reasoning

  1. Jurisdiction: The Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the petition, as the issue raised was a legal question regarding the interpretation of the statute.
  2. Interpretation of “60 Days”: The Court recognized that in legal contexts, “days” is typically understood to exclude weekends and legal holidays. This interpretation aligns with longstanding regulatory practices in immigration law, where deadlines are extended to the next business day if they fall on a weekend or holiday.
  3. Regulatory Background: The Court noted that this interpretation was consistent with immigration regulations dating back to the 1950s, which provided that deadlines falling on weekends or holidays should extend to the next business day. This practice has been applied in the context of other immigration deadlines.
  4. Congressional Intent: The Court found that when Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, it did so against the backdrop of these longstanding regulatory practices. Thus, the Court presumed Congress intended for this rule to apply to the voluntary departure deadline as well.
  5. Government’s Counterarguments: The government argued that voluntary departure deadlines should be treated differently because of the 60-day period chosen by Congress. The Court rejected this argument, noting that nothing in the statutory text or legislative history indicated such an intent.

  (h) Editorial Note

  Citations:

  • Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)
  • United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906)
  • 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2)
  • 8 U.S.C. § 1252

  (i) Dissenting Opinions

  1. Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Alito, and by Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett in parts): (1)argued that the statutory text clearly refers to calendar days, and courts should not rewrite deadlines based on policy preferences or historical administrative practice; and (2) warned against applying regulatory gloss to clear statutory provisions.
  2. Justice Alito (joined by Justice Kavanaugh): (1) emphasized textual fidelity and warned that the Court’s decision risks judicially amending clear statutory language; and (2) expressed concern that the majority’s interpretive approach blurs the distinction between legislative and judicial roles.
  3. Justice Barrett (joined by Justice Kavanaugh): (1) Focused on statutory interpretation principles; and (2) Criticized the majority for stretching a rule developed in the regulatory context to govern statutory deadlines without textual support.

  (j) Conclusion

  The Supreme Court’s ruling in Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi clarifies a significant procedural issue in immigration law: when voluntary departure deadlines fall on a weekend or legal holiday, noncitizens may rely on the next business day to take action without penalty. This interpretation aligns immigration law with broader legal norms governing deadline calculations across federal practice.

  The decision promotes procedural fairness and reflects a pragmatic understanding of how litigants interact with government systems—most of which do not operate on weekends or holidays. By siding with longstanding regulatory practice and rejecting a rigid textual reading of “days” as calendar days, the Court ensures consistency within immigration procedures and prevents unjust procedural defaults caused solely by timing.

  • Legal Significance: The Court reinforced the principle that statutory terms, especially those related to deadlines, must be read in light of established administrative and procedural norms unless Congress clearly says otherwise.
  • Practical Impact: Noncitizens and their counsel can now be assured that voluntary departure deadlines falling on weekends or holidays will not jeopardize their procedural rights if filings occur on the next business day.
  • Institutional Message: The Court’s majority emphasized a harmonized legal system over hyper-literalism, signaling a willingness to interpret statutes in context—especially when agencies have developed longstanding practices.

  This ruling also exposes a philosophical divide on the Court about the role of precedent, administrative interpretation, and textualism. While the majority favored a contextual and historical lens, the dissenters advocated strict adherence to the statutory text, warning against judicial overreach.

  April 22, 2025

  23-929, Immigration Law, United States Supreme Court Law Review

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• Bondi v. Vanderstok (2025)

  On March 26, 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States released its judicial opinion of Bondi v. Vanderstock (2025).

  Here is a quick break down:

  (a) Overview:
  The Supreme Court reviewed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) rule expanding the definition of “firearm” under the Gun Control Act (GCA) to include weapon parts kits and partially completed frames or receivers. The Fifth Circuit had previously struck down the rule, finding it inconsistent with the statutory language of the GCA.

  (b) Parties:

  • Petitioners: Ashley Moody, Attorney General of Florida, and the United States Government (ATF).
  • Respondents: Various gun manufacturers and individuals challenging the ATF’s rule.

  (c) Procedural Posture:
  The District Court vacated the ATF rule, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision, ruling that the GCA did not cover weapon parts kits or unfinished frames or receivers. The government sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.

  (d) Facts:

  • The GCA requires firearm manufacturers, importers, and dealers to obtain federal licenses, conduct background checks, and apply serial numbers to firearms.
  • The Act defines a “firearm” as (A) any weapon designed to or readily convertible to expel a projectile by an explosive and (B) the frame or receiver of such a weapon.
  • Advances in firearm manufacturing led to a rise in “ghost guns,” untraceable firearms assembled from weapon parts kits.
  • In 2022, the ATF issued a rule classifying certain kits and partially completed frames/receivers as firearms under the GCA.
  • Gun manufacturers challenged the rule, arguing it exceeded ATF’s statutory authority.
  • The Fifth Circuit held that the GCA did not cover weapon parts kits or unfinished frames and receivers.

  (e) Question Presented:
  Does the ATF’s rule interpreting the GCA to cover weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers exceed the agency’s statutory authority?

  (f) Holding:
  No. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that the ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA.

  (g)Reasoning:

  1. Weapon Parts Kits: The Court found that the term “weapon” in the GCA can apply to unfinished objects if their intended function is clear. The Court noted that some weapon parts kits, like Polymer80’s “Buy Build Shoot” kit, contain all necessary components for a firearm and can be assembled in minutes with common tools. Since similar incomplete firearms (e.g., starter guns) are treated as weapons under the GCA, the Court held that certain kits qualify as firearms under §921(a)(3)(A).
  2. Partially Complete Frames and Receivers: The Court ruled that artifact nouns like “frame” and “receiver” can include unfinished versions. The GCA requires serialization of incomplete weapons and silencers, supporting ATF’s authority to regulate at least some unfinished frames and receivers.
  3. Rejection of Facial Challenge: Because at least some weapon parts kits and unfinished receivers clearly fall under the GCA’s scope, a facial challenge to the ATF’s rule fails.
  4. Rejecting Plaintiffs’ Arguments: The Court dismissed concerns about potential conflicts with the National Firearms Act (NFA) and the rule of lenity, stating that the GCA’s language supports ATF’s interpretation.

  (h) Editorial Note:

  • The Court emphasized that not all weapon parts kits or unfinished frames are necessarily firearms, but some clearly qualify, making a facial challenge inappropriate.
  • The decision reaffirms ATF’s regulatory authority over certain firearm components, potentially impacting the ghost gun market.

  (i) Dissenting Opinions:

  • Justice Thomas and Justice Alito (Dissents): They argued that the statutory definition of “firearm” does not extend to unassembled kits or unfinished frames. They cautioned that the Court’s ruling improperly expands ATF’s regulatory power beyond Congress’s intent.

  (j) Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court upheld ATF’s rule, allowing regulation of certain weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers under the GCA. The decision clarifies the definition of “firearm” in response to evolving gun manufacturing practices and the rise of untraceable weapons.

  March 26, 2025

  Constitutional Law, ghost-guns, news, poetry, politics, Second Amendment, United States Supreme Court Law Review, writing

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• TikTok Inc. v. Garland & Firebaugh v. Garland (2025)

  On January 17, 2025, the United States Supreme Court released its final judgment concerning the consolidated cases TikTok Inc. v. Garland and Firebaugh v. Garland (2025), which were argued on January 10, 2025. In a per curiam decision (9-0), the Court affirmed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which on December 6, 2024, stated that the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA), 38 Stat. 955, did not violate the First Amendment, as it “served a significant governmental interest in protecting national security.” The legislation was deemed narrowly tailored to address legitimate concerns about foreign influence and data security risks posed by applications like TikTok with ties to adversary nations, such as China (TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 598 U.S. ___, 2025).

  *

  Parties: The petitioners in this consolidated case are: (1) TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Ltd., a technology platform and its foreign parent company; and (2) Brian Firebaugh et. al., the individual TikTok content users and creators. The respondent in this consolidated case is Merrick B. Garland, the Attorney General of the United States, and representative of the U.S. government executive authority.

  *

  Procedural Posture: Following the enactment of PAFACA in April 2024, TikTok and ByteDance filed suit in federal court, alleging the law violated the First Amendment and other constitutional protections. Individual content creators, led by Brian Firebaugh, filed a separate suit arguing the ban restricted their rights to free expression and livelihood. The District Court ruled in favor of the government, emphasizing national security concerns as a compelling interest. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, finding PAFCA constitutional. Ultimately, both cases were consolidated and granted certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, focusing on the interplay between free speech rights and national security concerns.

  *

  Facts: The facts considered for this case were: (1) PAFACA was passed in response to concerns over data privacy and foreign influence tied to TikTok’s Chinese ownership (ByteDance); (2) the law mandated ByteDance to divest TikTok’s U.S. operations or face a ban within the United States; (3) TikTok claimed this action was unconstitutional, arguing that it unfairly targeted the company and its users without evidence of harm; (4) individual content creators like Firebaugh contended that the ban would eliminate their primary platform for creative expression, adversely affecting their livelihoods and freedom of speech; and (5) the government justified the legislation as necessary to prevent potential misuse of user data by adversarial foreign entities, particularly China.

  *

  Question Presented: Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA), as applied to petitioners, violates the First Amendment of the United States Federal Constitution.

  *

  Holding: The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of PAFACA, ruling that it did not violate the First Amendment or other constitutional protections. The Court determined that the law served a significant governmental interest in protecting national security and was narrowly tailored to address this interest.

  *

  Reasoning: The Supreme Court of the United States considered: (1) a First Amendment analysis, United States v. O’Brien (1968), 392 U.S. 367; (2) the bill of attainder argument, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977), 433 U.S. 425; (3) due process claims; and (4) policy of national security.

  (1) The Court applied intermediate scrutiny, recognizing that while PAFACA restricted access to a specific platform, it was content-neutral and justified by a significant governmental interest–notably, safeguarding national security–finding the law was narrowly tailored to achieve this interest without unnecessarily infringing on free speech. The precedent here refers to United States v. O’Brien (1968) which established the standard for analyzing content-neutral restrictions.

  (2) The Court rejected the claim that PAFACA was a bill of attainder, emphasizing that it did not impose punishment but was regulatory in nature, designed to mitigate security risks. the precedent here refers to Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977), which guided the Court in distinguishing between punitive and regulatory legislative actions. In doing so, the Court distinguished between this case and United States v. Lovett (1946), 328 U.S. 303, where legislation explicitly targeted specific individuals for punishment. Here, the Court concluded that PAFACA was a regulatory measure addressing national security concerns, not punitive legislation targeting TikTok or ByteDance.

  (3) The Court found that TikTok and ByteDance were afforded sufficient procedural safeguards, including opportunities to challenge the government’s findings. The legislation was not arbitrary, but instead based on documented concerns over data misuse and foreign influence.

  (4) The court acknowledged the balance between individual freedoms and the government’s duty to protect against evolving national security threats. The decision affirmed that laws addressing such threats must be narrowly tailored and evidence-based.

  *

  Concurring Opinion (Justice Sotomayor): Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence agreed that PAFACA implicated the First Amendment but also supported the conclusion that it survived heightened scrutiny. She disagreed with the majority approach in Part II A, arguing that the Court should not “assume without deciding” that PAFACA affects the First Amendment. Alternatively, she maintained and established precedent left “no doubt” that it does, emphasizing: (1) TikTok engages in expressive activity by compiling and curating material, which is subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny, see Moody v. NetChoice LLC., 603 U.S. 707 (2024), Arcara v. Cloud Books Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986), and Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) ; (2) PAFACA barred entities from distributing TikTok’s speech unless it went through a qualified divestiture, which imposed a burden on its expressive conduct, further restricting TikTok’s ability to collaborate with entities on its content recommendation algorithm; and (3) right to associate PAFACA affected content creators’ rights to associate with TikTok as their preferred publisher for speaking purposes, see Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006). Despite these points, Justice Sotomayor agreed that PAFACA withstood scrutiny because it served a compelling governmental interest (protecting national security) and was narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.

  *

  Concurring Opinion (Justice Gorsuch): Justice Gorsuch concurred in the judgment, agreeing that PAFACA survived constitutional scrutiny, however, he based his concurrence on a narrower interpretation of TikTok’s First Amendment claims and a strong deference to Congress’s national security determinations. He emphasized: (1) while U.S. jurisprudence recognizes some First Amendment protections for U.S.-based corporations, those protections may not fully extend to foreign-owned entities operating in the United States, especially where national security is implicated; (2) Congress, with access to classified intelligence and expertise, is better equipped to assess the risks posed by foreign entities like TikTok, cautioning against courts second-guessing legislative determinations in this context; (3) PAFACA is a content-neutral law, targeting TikTok not because of the content on its platform but because of its ownership structure and potential ties to a foreign adversary, arguing this distinction placed PAFACA squarely within Congress’s regulatory authority; and (5) concern about setting a precedent that could extend constitutional protections too broadly to foreign-owned corporations, potentially undermining the government’s ability to safeguard national security.

  January 17, 2025

  Administrative Law, Bill of Attainder Clause, Constitutional Law, Fifth Amendment, First Amendment, National Security Law, United States Supreme Court Law Review

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• United States Supreme Court

  This article serves as a test to the banuelos.estate website I am building. In it, I will share what I learn about the law, as I learn it. When I think of the law, as an American, my mind goest directly to the United States Supreme Court. I learned to read transcripts, listen to oral arguments, and read the judicial opinions that come from these arguments. I am not: (1) an attorney; (2) a law school graduate; or (3) a law school student.

  With that said, I am interested in what our 9 Justices have to say, since this is the highest court in the United States. What you read on banuelos.estate is my opinion, not to be confused with legal advice. If you need legal assistance, seek out a licensed attorney in the jurisdiction that pertains to you. My hope in writing this is that you stay informed on what the law is and how to verify it for yourself.

  In a time where legacy media provides us with news updates, critical analysis skills are rare. I will walk you through my research method process: (1) citation; (2) case overview; (3) judicial opinion review; and (4) reflection. Each post will include these four elements. While this information is publicly available, apart from my reflections, the average individual without a legal background might not know how to obtain it. I encourage anyone interested in the Supreme Court to listen to the oral arguments, read the transcripts and the judicial opinions for themselves.

  December 5, 2024

  United States Supreme Court Law Review

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